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Holland: Lake Cargo Controversy
WEST FIRGINIA L 4W QUARTERLY
LAKE CARGO CONTROVERSY.-In previous issues of this
Quarterly we have published articles summarizing the history and progress of the dispute between the coal producing fields of West Virginia and those of Pennsylvania and
Ohio." The last issue contained a summary of the proceeding before the Commission, known as Investigation and
Suspension Docket No. 2967, wherein it was decided that
the southern carriers had failed to justify their proposed
20c per ton reduction in Lake-Cargo rates. Following this
decision, the producers of the southern fields applied to the
statutory court 2 for an'injunction against the enforcement
of the above order. cancelling the proposed rates.8 The
court reviewed the past decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and handed down a decision awarding
the injunctive relief asked.
The court admitted that it could not interfere with a decision of the Commission if substantially supported in the
evidence, if it was a proceeding within the authority of the
Commission, if there was no error in the application of
rules of law, and if there was no irregularity in the proceedings. The weight assigned to the evidence nor the wisdom
of the decision cannot be questioned in a court of law or
equity. The court did, however, hold that there were several errors in the decision complained of which justify it in
awarding relief in this instance, as follows:
1. The Commission exceeded its powers by basing the decision, in part at least, upon industrial conditions, and in attempting to regulate economic conditions thereby.4 The commission has the power to prescribe minimum rates where the
rates proposed are unreasonable per se, or so low as to cast a
burden on other traffic. It also has the power where needed to prevent rate wars, or to protect a particular carrier in
reasonable earnings. The commission is not given power to
regulate industry or economic conditions by the Hoch-Smith
Resolution for, so far as this resolution is concerned, the
effect is only to authorize the commission to remove undue
burdens or advantages imposed by unjustly discriminatory
or preferential rates. Since the rate from the southern
W. VA. LAW QuAR., 202 and 272.
Composed of Northeott and Parker, Circuit Judges, and 31cClintie, District Judge.
Anchor Coal Co. et al., v. United States of America, et a,, Interstate Commerce
Commission, et at., interveners, 25 F. (2d) 462 (1928).
The Commission strenuously denies any such basis for its decision.
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fields is higher than the rate from the Pennsylvania and
Ohio fields no such burden or advantage can be found. Congress did not intend to make the commission the arbiter of
industrial destiny by this resolution.
In cancelling the rates proposed by the southern carriers the commission gave as a reason that the carriers
failed to justify them under this resolution. It is held that
the carrier had no such duty, as the rate could not be made
to depend on the condition of the whole industry as a test
of its propriety.
2. The commission erred in that it proceeded on an erroneous theory of law in holding that the burden was on the
southern carriersto justify a reduction of the rates by a comparison of the proposed rates with the lower maximum rates
prescribed for the competing fi'elds.
The error is not as to the procedure before the commission but because the failure to meet the burden meant adverse action by the commission. The carrier still has the
right to initiate rates. The statute under which the above
ruling was made placed the burden of justification on the
carrier where the proposed rates are higher, not where they
are lower. The statute is quoted.
"At any hearing involving a rate, * * * * * increased *
• * *, the burden of proof to show that the increased
rate, * * *,is just and reasonable shall be on the carrier." 5

The section quoted seems to express a legislative policy
favoring low rates, also since increased rates are specifically mentioned, decreased rates would seem to be excluded by intention. Further, while increased rates generally result in higher cost to the public lowered rates are
generally of great public value. Hence the court thinks the
burden should properly be on those opposing the reduction
to prove it unreasonable. The interests of the consumer are
to be considered in every case of this kind. The court
further says that as a matter of logic a decrease in rates
might be condemned by comparison with minimum rates
from the competing district-not with maximum rates. All
previous comparisons are said to have been between the
maximum rate proposed and the maximum rate from the
Section 15, paragraph 7, TRANSPORTATION AcT of 1920.
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competing district.
3. It is held to be error in that the commission proceeded
on an erroneous theory of law in holding that the carriermust
justify the proposed rate decrease under Section 15 (a) (2)
of the TransportationAct of 1920.
This section provides for the commission placing the
carriers in territories or rate groups and adjusting group
rates so the average net return shall be fair and reasonable
for all. This section denies the right of the carrier to earn
more than a net six per centum, and affirms the right to
earn that much, if possible. Congress intended that the
commission should approximate the desired result as nearly
as possible. The court held that the section does not require the total net return to be used as evidence to fix a
particular rate, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Union Pacific Company.6 It follows that the carrier need not
justify reduced rates proposed with reference to every existing rate within the same rate group. The burden of
proof in such a case would be impossible. It is held that if
the reduction can be shown by the commission to (1) impair earnings of the proposing carrier, (2) unduly burden
other traffic, or (3) lead to a rate war, then the commission
may forbid it in the exercise of the minimum rate power,7
citing United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Company.
In the absence of such a showing, it is held that no power
exists under Section 15 (a) (2) to declare the proposed
rate void.
-R.

PAUL HOLLAND.

222 U. S. 541, 32 S. Ct. 108, 56 L. ed. 808 (1912).
263 U. S. 515, 524, 44 S. Ct. 189, 193, 68 L. ed. 417

(1924).
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